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UPHOLDING THE PUBLIC TRUST
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
MATTHEW THOR KIRSCH
INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 1970, this country’s first “Earth Day,” the Pennsylvania legislature approved a proposed amendment to the state
constitution.1 It read:
Section 27. Natural resources and the public estate
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.2

On May 18, 1971, Pennsylvania’s citizens overwhelmingly approved
the amendment, thereby codifying it as Article I, Section 27 of
their state constitution.3 At or near the same time Pennsylvania
was amending its constitution to reflect a new premium on environmental protection, many other states were doing the same.4

1. Pennsylvania’s constitution requires that any amendment be approved by a majority of both houses of the state legislature and then approved by a majority of voters in a
referendum. See Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania
Constitution: Twenty Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123 n.1
(1990).
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Because the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that two
consecutive legislatures approve an amendment before it is submitted to the citizens, this
was the first time the legislature approved the amendment. It was approved for the second time in the 1971–72 session. See Kury, supra note 1, at 123.
3. See Kury, supra note 1, at 123–24. Just over one million voters favored the
amendment; about a quarter-million opposed it. See id.
4. See Roland M. Frye, Jr., Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5
ENVTL. L. REP. 50028–29 (1975); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions, Land Use, and
Public Resources: The Gift Outright, 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 13, 28–29; Robert A.
McLaren, Comment, Environmental Protection Based on State Constitutional Law: A Call
for Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 123, 126–27 (1990).
For constitutional provisions that refer explicitly to the environment or natural
resources, see ALA. CONST. art. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7;
HAW. CONST. art. XI; ILL. CONST. art. XI; LA. CONST. art. IX; MASS. CONST. § 179;
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21;
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Why did this flurry of state constitutional amendment occur?
Why didn’t state citizens request that their legislators pass comprehensive environmental protection statutes instead? The author of
Pennsylvania’s amendment suggested his state’s constitutional
change out of a desire to “give our natural environment the same
kind of constitutional protection that [is] given our political
rights.”5 A constitutional amendment, as opposed to a statute,
protects policy judgments from the ebb and flow of the political
tide. A constitutional amendment becomes part of a document that
is “the ultimate repository of a people’s considered judgment
about basic matters of public policy.”6 A constitution represents a
commitment by those citizens whom it governs to preserve, over
time, the institutions and principles the document contains.7 Citizens of Pennsylvania and other states presumably determined that
environmental protection is a “basic matter[] of public policy;”8
and therefore added provisions requiring environmental protection
to their state constitutions to commit themselves and future generations to this project.
In theory, an environmental provision in a constitution could
have a wide range of effects. Depending on how the provision is
written, it might reach any number of activities that harm the
environment. Such activities range from the usual topics of constitutional concern, such as government action and inaction, to much
more controversial subjects of constitutional concern, including
private action and even private inaction.9 A constitutional provi-

N.Y. CONST. art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 36; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; UTAH CONST.
art. XVIII; VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
5. Franklin L. Kury, The Pennsylvania Environmental Protection Amendment, PA. B.
ASS’N Q., Apr. 1987, at 85, 87.
6. A. E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV.
193, 229 (1972).
7. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119,
1143–46 (1995).
8. Howard, supra note 6, at 229.
9. The Pennsylvania amendment, for example, was thought at the time of its proposal to allow state citizens to challenge, at a minimum, direct government action which
caused environmental harm. See Kury, supra note 5, at 89. It was also seen as a potential limit on acts by private parties subject to government regulations, such as a power
company that wanted to build new transmission lines, and as an exhortation against government inaction concerning the correction of current environmental damage and violations of existing environmental protection statutes. See id. at 90.
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sion might also create or expand citizens’ standing to challenge
actions that harm the environment.10
Since the earliest environmental provisions were enacted,
however, commentators have almost universally lamented their
ineffectiveness.11 Several potential barriers to the effectiveness of
such provisions exist; all prevent the provisions from having substantive effect. In some states, constitutions’ environmental protection provisions appear to have gone unused by pro-environment
litigants.12 In other states, courts have heard cases based on constitutions’ environmental protection provisions, but have refused to
give the provisions effect for one or both of two reasons. First,
courts have been very reluctant to hold that environmental protection provisions are self-executing.13 A provision that is not selfexecuting has no independent legal significance; such a provision
may only be given force by a legislature’s enactment of enabling
statutes. Second, courts have been unwilling to read constitutions’
environmental protection provisions as having any effect on standing requirements, which are traditionally difficult for pro-environment plaintiffs to meet.14

10. Pennsylvania’s amendment was also intended to grant to individual citizens standing to challenge impairments of their “environmental rights.” See id. at 89.
11. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political
Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 847 (1990); Oliver A.
Pollard, III, Note, A Promise Unfulfilled: Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions
and the Self-Execution Question, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 351 (1986); McLaren,
supra note 4, at 152; Tammy Wyatt-Shaw, Comment, The Doctrine of Self-Execution and
the Environmental Provisions of the Montana State Constitution: “They Mean Something,”
15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 219, 231–35 (1994); cf. José L. Fernandez, State Constitutions,
Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?,
17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 333 (1993) (agreeing that provisions have been ineffective but
praising this trend).
12. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. XVIII (no appellate cases interpret this provision);
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 36 (only reported cases involve state’s use of provision as an
affirmative grant of power).
13. See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Va. 1985) (holding
that an environmental protection provision in the Virginia constitution is not self-executing); see generally Fernandez, supra note 11, at 334 (noting that state courts have used
the doctrine of self-execution to thwart the intent of adopters of environmental provisions
in state constitutions); Pollard, supra note 11, at 351 (explaining that courts have held
environmental provisions in state constitutions “ineffective absent additional legislation”).
14. See, e.g., Scattering Fork Drainage Dist. v. Ogilvie, 311 N.E.2d 203, 210 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1974) (holding that plaintiff had no standing despite the Illinois constitution’s creation
of a “right to a healthful environment” enforceable “against any party, governmental or
private,” IL. CONST. art. II, § 2); Wyatt-Shaw, supra note 11, at 241–43 (discussing likely
obstacles to standing for plaintiffs attempting to use the Montana constitution’s provision).
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In reviewing the effectiveness of environmental protection
provisions in state constitutions, commentators have focused especially on those provisions which courts have held are not self-executing. According to Professor Lynda Butler, courts’ holdings that
these provisions are not self-executing have meant that “the incorporation of environmental provisions into state constitutions has
not brought about the anticipated results.”15 Professor José
Fernandez makes this case more strongly, arguing that, by refusing
to find that constitutions’ environmental protection provisions are
self-executing, “state courts have rendered opinions which appear
to thwart the adopters’ intent to make those provisions effective.”16 Previous student authors have reached more dramatic
conclusions. One student wrote that environmental provisions in
state constitutions are “almost meaningless,” and that any promise
of environmental protection they provide is “illusory.”17 Another
student described the demise of such provisions more melodramatically:
Faced with the prospect of continuing environmental degradation,
people across America concluded that the time has come to take
matters out of the hands of elected officials. They chose to elevate environmental protection to constitutional status where, they
hoped, these values would be beyond the political milieu, and
where they would receive the highest protection. Citizens counted
on the judiciary to guarantee these environmental values. But
state courts have let America down.18

Despite the strength with which this view has been stated, this
Note argues that it is deceptive. In some states, constitutional
provisions have played a significant role in enforcing the rights
that they ostensibly guarantee. Although most state constitutions’
environmental provisions have proven to be largely ineffective,
courts in at least four states—Louisiana, Alaska, Pennsylvania, and
Florida—have used environmental provisions in their respective
constitutions to review state action. Courts in two other states—

15. Butler, supra note 11, at 847.
16. Fernandez, supra note 11, at 334. Fernandez concludes, however, that the findings
against self-execution are correct. See id. at 375–87; see also infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
17. Pollard, supra note 11, at 380–81.
18. McLaren, supra note 4, at 151–52.
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Michigan and Hawaii—have suggested that they might do the same.
A number of the constitutions’ environmental protection provisions, including all of those in this successful minority, share
some affinity with the ancient common law doctrine of the public
trust. The central principle of the public trust doctrine has been
summarized as follows:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use
of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either
to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.19

Each of the successful provisions invokes some combination of the
concepts undergirding the public trust doctrine: conservation, public access, and trusteeship. Alaska’s provision, for example, focuses
on conserving natural resources for public use: “Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to
the people for common use.”20 The Louisiana constitution provides another example. Its provision refers to the conservation of a
broad range of natural resources for the public:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and aesthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as
possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the
people.21

A third example comes from Hawaii’s constitution, which explicitly
creates a public trust over all of the state’s natural resources:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and
its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air,
minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development

19. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 490 (1970).
For provisions containing some form of the word “trust,” see HAW. CONST. art. XI;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. For provisions outlining public trust
principles, see ALA. CONST. art. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7;
LA. CONST. art. IX; MASS. CONST. § 179; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; MONT. CONST.
art. IX, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 5; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
20. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
21. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with
their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the
State.
All public natural resources are held in trust by the State
for the benefit of the people.22

This Note contends that courts in states that have given effect
to constitutions’ environmental protection provisions have interpreted them as evocations of the public trust. Although the exact
mechanism through which the public trust doctrine affects a constitutional provision varies from state to state, the principle behind
the public trust doctrine seems to have enabled these state courts
to honor their citizens’ commitment to the environmental values
which they have incorporated in their constitutions.
Part I of this Note provides a brief description of the public
trust doctrine and its recent role in American environmental law.
Part II addresses the issue of self-executability of constitutions’
environmental provisions; that is, whether they have independent
legal significance without enabling legislation. Although several
prior commentators have noted that courts have almost uniformly
held that these provisions are not self-executing,23 this Note describes four methods by which courts have surmounted this obstacle. Part III addresses another common problem: courts’ refusal to
interpret constitutions’ environmental provisions to affect citizen
standing.24 It describes two ways in which courts have dealt with
the relationship of such provisions to standing. Part IV describes
methods in which the courts that have surmounted the obstacles of
self-execution and standing have used the public trust doctrine to
put constitutions’ environmental provisions to work. Finally, the
Note concludes that the courts in this minority have been truer to
the principles that led to the ratification of constitutions’ environmental protection provisions in the first place, and notes the potential for courts in other states to do the same.
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine “is based on the notion that the
public holds inviolable rights in certain lands and resources, and

22. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
23. See Fernandez, supra note 11, at 365; Pollard, supra note 11, at 351.
24. See Howard, supra note 6, at 224–28; Wyatt-Shaw, supra note 11, at 241–43.
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that regardless of title ownership, the state retains certain rights in
such lands and resources in trust for the public.”25 This conception of public rights has two ancient bases. First, under Roman law
“‘the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the sea shore’
were the property of no man but rather were common to all.”26
Second, early English common law provided that title to tidelands
had two components: the King’s right of jus privatum, which could
be alienated, and the jus publicum rights of navigation and fishing,
which were held by the King in inalienable trust for the public.27
The classic American conception of the public trust doctrine is
found in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,28 where the Supreme Court invalidated Illinois’ grant of title to land under Lake
Michigan as a violation of the state’s common law public trust
obligations.29 Other early public trust decisions in the United
States were mainly confined, like Illinois Central, to disputes concerning public access to navigable waters or to the lands beneath
them.30
In 1970, however, Professor Joseph Sax gave new vitality to
the public trust doctrine by suggesting that it could be expanded
and used by environmentally concerned citizens as a litigation
tool.31 In his view, the doctrine required courts to review with
skepticism any government action that restricted or burdened public access to potentially any natural resource.32 Since the publication of Sax’s initial work on the public trust, state courts have
applied the doctrine to require public access to various resources
other than navigable water and the lands beneath, including the

25. 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 10.05[1] (1995).
26. Id. (quoting JUSTINIAN, INST. 2.1.1 (T. Sanders Trans. 1st Am ed. 1876)).
27. See id.
28. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
29. See id. at 452–55, 460.
30. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927) (concerning the
transfer of submerged lands to a steel company so that the company could construct a
dock and wharf); People v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 88 (1913) (concerning the
state’s taking of navigable tidelands).
31. See Sax, supra note 19, at 556–57.
32. See id. at 563–65.
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dry sand areas of a beach,33 portage routes near rivers,34 and
wildlife.35
Commentators have also jumped on the public trust bandwagon, suggesting that the doctrine might be extended to resources
such as wildlife36 and public lands.37 Other commentators, however, have been dismayed by the resurgence of the public trust
doctrine, criticizing it on grounds that it lacks a coherent doctrinal
basis,38 fails to reflect current environmental concerns,39 requires
a judiciary with a pro-environment bias,40 and is undemocratic.41
Many of the state constitutions’ environmental protection
provisions were written with the public trust doctrine in mind.42
By constitutionalizing and expanding the public trust doctrine,
states should be able to avoid the criticism that it lacks a doctrinal
basis,43 as the text of the constitutional provision itself will become the basis of the doctrine. The suggestion that its successful
enforcement requires a pro-environment judiciary44 has no more

33. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
34. See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091
(Mont. 1984).
35. See Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
36. See Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J. ENVTL. L.
& LITIG. 107, 107–08, 118 (1986).
37. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 316 (1980).
38. See Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 398–99 (1991)
(“None of the judicial examinations and very little of the recent scholarship on the public
trust doctrine have explained why these principles [ordering societal interests in property]
arose and what function they have served in the development of legal and social institutions.”).
39. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 710–12
(1986) (arguing that the doctrine’s traditional promotion of commerce and public access
are “at odds with modern environmental conservation and protection laws”).
40. See id. at 712–13 (suggesting that past cases which used the public trust doctrine
to support certain favored developmental activities and the doctrine’s vagueness would
allow judges to use the public trust doctrine to support decisions that actually harm the
environment).
41. See James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the
Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENV. U.
L. REV. 565, 583 (1986) (concluding that the doctrine is a “tool[] for political losers or
for those seeking to avoid the costs of becoming political winners”).
42. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
43. See Rieser, supra note 38, at 398–99.
44. See Lazarus, supra note 39, at 712–13.
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force than a contention that the First Amendment depends on a
pro-speech judiciary to give it effect. Finally, the process used to
constitutionalize public trust values answers criticisms that the
doctrine is undemocratic.45 On the contrary, incorporating public
trust values in a state constitution reflects the state’s democratic
choice to make a long-term commitment to those values.46
In at least a few states, the public trust doctrine has metamorphosed from a common law guarantee of access to a limited resource into a broader, constitutional requirement of resource preservation and use. The next section of this Note examines the ways
that courts in a few states have avoided the first obstacle to the
enforcement of this constitutional requirement, the issue of selfexecution.
II. SELF-EXECUTION
In theory, an environmental protection provision in a state
constitution has no independent substantive effect unless it is considered self-executing. Whether it was intended to allow judicial
review of government action alone or of private action as well,
only a self-executing provision can have legal effect independent of
any existing environmental statutes.47 Although previous commentators have been quick to point out the tendency of courts to rule
that constitutions’ environmental protection provisions are not selfexecuting,48 certain courts have in fact avoided the consequences
of non-self-execution through several methods that are not mutually exclusive. Some courts have simply held that the environmental
protection provision is self-executing; courts in Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Michigan have taken this approach. Other courts have
bypassed the issue by holding that the relevant provision imposes
upon the state a mandatory duty of natural resource protection
which has already been satisfied by a legislative enactment. Courts
in Louisiana and, to a lesser extent, Michigan have taken this
approach. Courts have also avoided the issue of self-execution by
holding that their state constitutions’ provision merely codifies preexisting public trust common law. Courts in Alaska and Louisiana
have used this technique, and the Hawaii courts have hinted at it.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See
See
See
See

Huffman, supra note 41, at 583.
Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 1143–46.
Fernandez, supra note 11, at 333.
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Florida courts have avoided addressing the issue of selfexecution, but nevertheless have used the Florida constitution’s environmental protection provision to guide decisions anyway.
One recent author, Professor José Fernandez, contends that
constitutions’ environmental protection provisions should not be
treated as self-executing.49 One problem he identifies is the
provisions’ vagueness.50 He also contends that courts are incapable of enforcing directives to the legislature that might result
from cases based on constitutions’ environmental protection provisions without violating the separation of powers, or that such provisions concern issues that constitute nonjusticiable “political questions” which threaten courts’ legitimacy.51
Fernandez’s position, however, bumps up against the standard
modern presumption that constitutional provisions are self-executing.52 This presumption, rather than the older one against selfexecution, gives more respect to citizens’ decisions to constitutionalize a value or a principle. Most commentators have correctly
argued that this presumption should apply to constitutions’ environmental protection provisions for the same reason.53
Several state courts have implicitly rejected Fernandez’s arguments and bucked the judicial trend against self-execution for constitutions’ environmental protection provisions, at least as far as
judicial review of government action is concerned. These courts
have used the public trust doctrine in varying degrees to bolster
their understanding of their constitutions’ environmental provisions.
Linking provisions with the ancient public trust doctrine has allowed courts in a few of these states to refer to a tradition at least
as old as those that Fernandez says give meaningful content to
other vague constitutional terms such as “due process” and “freedom of speech.”54 By generally restricting the scope of their review to government acts other than those of the legislature, and

49. See Fernandez, supra note 11, at 376–84.
50. See id. at 376–82.
51. See id. at 382–84.
52. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 169, 199 (1983).
53. See Pollard, supra note 11, at 380–81; see also Butler, supra note 11, at 854–60
(discussing same issue but using “political question” terminology). But cf. McLaren, supra
note 4, at 132–37 (arguing against a general presumption of self-execution in the absence
of clear language indicating a “public policy” or a “right” to a healthy environment with
no reference to the state legislature).
54. See Fernandez, supra note 11, at 377–80.

FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\KIRSCH.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:45am

1997]

THE PUBLIC TRUST & STATE CONSTITUTIONS

1179

by excluding legislative or private citizens’ acts from the purview
of their decisions, courts in this minority have also refrained from
issuing decisions that too closely resemble legislation.
A. Self-Executing Provisions
The first technique used by courts to avoid the consequences
of non-self-execution is simply to hold that a provision is self-executing. Courts in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Louisiana have all
done this, but only the former two have explained the reasoning
behind their decisions. This construction is probably most in line
with the intent of the provisions’ adopters, since very few
constitutions’ environmental protection provisions indicate that
they will not be self-executing. This interpretation also comports
with the “plain meaning rule” typically used in state constitutional
construction.55
The issue of self-execution has been most fully explored in
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 27 was
intended by its author to be self-executing.56 Pennsylvania’s courts
eventually settled on this position insofar as the provision applies
to state action.57 The provision’s potential to encompass review of
private acts is still undetermined.58
The battle lines for this latter issue were drawn in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,59 where the
Commonwealth sued to enjoin a private company from constructing a 307-foot high observation tower 400 feet away from
Gettysburg National Military Park.60 The state appellate court
held that Section 27 was self-executing even when applied to action taken by a private party.61 It noted that this provision was
unique to the state constitution in imposing on the government an
affirmative duty to protect the environment, and concluded that
this construction made sense in light of the fact that “the despoliation of the environment is an act to be expected, in our private

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
tysburg
60.
61.

See Williams, supra note 52, at 196–97.
See Kury, supra note 1, at 124–25.
See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
See id.
302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), aff’d, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) [hereinafter GetTower I].
See id. at 887.
See id. at 892.
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ownership society, from private persons.”62 The court also rejected the argument that the terms of the provision were too
vague to support self-execution, noting that amorphous concepts
such as due process and equal protection had been “attacked with
gusto” by the courts.63 Despite this reasoning, the appellate court
upheld the lower court’s conclusion that the construction of the
tower did not violate the public trust in the environment, because
the Commonwealth was unable to demonstrate “manifest error” in
this conclusion.64
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then affirmed the appellate
court’s ruling that the construction of the tower could proceed.65
Yet the opinion of the court (signed by only two justices) held
that Section 27 was not self-executing because it expanded rather
than limited the powers of government,66 and because a contrary
holding could lead to due process and equal protection violations
if individuals were singled out and prosecuted by the state for
despoiling the environment.67 Two other justices concurred in an
opinion that did not reach the issue of self-execution,68 while another concurred in result only.69 The remaining two justices argued vigorously in dissent that Section 27 was self-executing and
that construction of the proposed tower would violate it.70 They
argued that the provision represented an overwhelming public
mandate to “install[] the common law public trust doctrine as a
constitutional right to environmental protection susceptible to
enforcement by an action in equity.”71 They agreed with the
Commonwealth Court that the provision’s vagueness and the resultant need for judicial interpretation did not prevent it from being
self-executing.72

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 893–95.
65. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 595
(Pa. 1973) [hereinafter Gettysburg Tower II].
66. See id. at 592. This is a traditional distinction in self-execution law. See
Fernandez, supra note 11, at 341–42.
67. See Gettysburg Tower II, 311 A.2d at 593–94.
68. See id. at 595–96 (Roberts, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 595 (Nix, J., concurring in the result).
70. See id. at 596–99 (Jones, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 596 (emphasis omitted).
72. See id. at 597.
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Later that same year, the Commonwealth Court heard its
most significant Section 27 case, Payne v. Kassab.73 Payne and
other citizens used Section 27 to challenge the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s proposed widening of a street in
Wilkes-Barre that would have encroached upon a park-like downtown commons area.74 The court used the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s even split on the issue of self-execution in Gettysburg
Tower as an affirmance of its position that Section 27 was a selfexecuting enactment of the public trust.75 The fact that this case
involved a challenge to governmental rather than to private action
reduced the magnitude of Section 27’s potential intrusion into
private citizens’ lives and therefore made this ruling less controversial. As in the earlier case, however, the court held that allowing
the action to proceed did not violate Section 27.
Payne was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court three
years later,76 but that court did not “explore the difficult terrain
of whether the amendment is or is not ‘self-executing.’”77 The Supreme Court said that this question might be important if the
Commonwealth were to use its trustee powers to seek to prevent
the otherwise legal use of private property, but that this issue did
not arise when, as in Payne, citizens sought to challenge state
action.78 In the latter case, the court said that no implementing
legislation was necessary to establish the Commonwealth’s duty to
conserve and maintain public natural resources for the benefit of
all the people, because the provision does so “by its own ipse
dixit.”79 None of the reported cases since Gettysburg Tower contain a challenge by the Commonwealth to a private property owner, so the issue of self-execution in Pennsylvania appears to be
settled at least until the state challenges another private landowner.
In summary, Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is considered self-executing for the purposes of allowing
judicial review of government action. For the purposes of allowing
judicial review of private action, Section 27’s status is unclear. The

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
See id. at 88.
See id. at 94, 97.
361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976).
Id. at 272.
See id.
Id.
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Commonwealth Court has held that the provision is also self-executing in this regard.80 The most recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case on point explicitly refused to address this question.81
In In re Highway US–24, the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that the Michigan Constitution’s environmental protection provision, Article 4, Section 52, was self-executing.82 In that case, the
plaintiffs, owners of land the state sought to condemn for road improvement, claimed that the law under which the state sought
condemnation was unconstitutional because it did not specifically
provide for compliance with the constitution’s environmental protection provision.83 The court analyzed the question of self-execution with its standard three-part test for this issue.84 First, it examined the common understanding of the language and determined that the provision’s requirement that “[t]he legislature shall
provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural
resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction”85 was normally understood as mandatory.86 Second, the
court examined the purpose of and the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the provision. It found that the purpose of the
provision was to impose on the state a mandatory duty of environmental protection.87 It then also found that while the circumstances surrounding the provision’s adoption were ambiguous, this ambiguity was not sufficient to overcome the clear common understanding and purpose of the provision.88 Finally, the court dismissed the third part of the test, its preference for constitutional
constructions over unconstitutional ones, as irrelevant.89 The court
thus concluded that this provision was self-executing.90
80. See Commonwealth v. National Battlefield Tower, 302 A.2d 886, 892 (Pa. Commw.
Ct.), aff’d, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). The provision reads: “The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hearby declared to be of paramount public
concern in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of the people. The
legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources
of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.” MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52.
81. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 272.
82. 220 N.W.2d 416, 426 (Mich. 1974).
83. See id. at 419.
84. See id. at 425 (citing Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Attorney Gen., 185 N.W.2d 9
(Mich. 1971)).
85. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52 (emphasis added).
86. See In re Highway US–24, 220 N.W.2d at 425.
87. See id. at 425–26.
88. See id. at 426.
89. See id.
90. See id. The court did not address the range of actions this holding could have
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Courts in Pennsylvania and Michigan have been the only
courts thus far to explain why their constitutions’ environmental
protection provisions are self-executing. Yet this position seems
consistent with the desires of the citizens of their states, who presumably wanted the provisions to have some effect when they
approved them.91
B. Provisions Creating a Mandatory But Previously Satisfied Duty
Courts have sometimes mitigated the controversial nature of a
holding that a provision is self-executing by simultaneously holding
that their state legislatures have previously satisfied the duties
imposed on them by their constitutions’ environmental provisions
through previously enacted environmental legislation. This technique papers over the issue of self-execution, but it allows the
courts to fulfill the expressed wishes of the state citizens without
violating the separation of powers by issuing specific directives to
the legislature. Courts in Michigan and Louisiana have used this
technique.
The Michigan Supreme Court helped insulate its In re Highway US–24 by holding that a previously enacted, generally applicable statute satisfied the mandatory duty of environmental protection imposed on Michigan by Article 4, Section 52.92 Section 52,
it said, required nothing more. By refusing to require any further
action by the legislature, the court avoided even the appearance of
violating the separation of powers.
The Louisiana Supreme Court used the same technique in
Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission.93 There, the court was asked to review the approval of permits issued to a corporation for the operation of a major hazardous waste facility.94 It held that Article IX, Section 1 of the state
constitution required the state legislature to enact laws establishing
the public trust for the “protection, conservation and replenish-

made subject to review because of its simultaneous pronouncement that the legislature
had already satisfied its duty through enacting a comprehensive environmental protection
statute. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
92. See In re Highway U.S.–24, 220 N.W.2d at 426–27.
93. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
94. See id. at 1154.
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ment”95 of all natural resources of the state. The holding was tantamount to one that Section 1 is self-executing, but the court did
not directly broach the issue of self-execution. Instead, it avoided
any possibility of directing legislative action by holding that the
Louisiana legislature had already fulfilled its mandate by enacting
a comprehensive environmental protection statute.96
These two decisions illustrate a second strategy for courts
faced with questions of self-execution. By simultaneously determining that a constitutional environmental provision is self-executing
and that prior general legislation satisfies the legislative duty imposed by a provision, courts in Louisiana and Michigan have given
substantive effect to their constitutions’ environmental protection
provisions with less danger of violating separation of powers principles.
C. Provisions Codifying Pre-Existing Common Law
A third method by which courts can avoid the difficulties
inherent in a finding that a constitution’s environmental provision
is self-executing is to hold that the provision does not create new
duties or responsibilities. Instead, a court can hold that the provision merely codifies and expands the reach of the public trust
doctrine under common law. This approach uses the pre-existing
standards of the doctrine to provide a ready answer to the traditional self-execution challenges of vagueness and separation of
powers. The Alaska Supreme Court has relied exclusively on this
method. Courts in Louisiana and Pennsylvania97 have also used
this technique. Finally, the Hawaii Supreme Court has suggested
that it might avoid self-execution problems in this fashion as well.
The self-executability of Alaska’s provision has never been
questioned by the courts in that state, but the Alaska Supreme
Court has made a de facto decision on self-execution. In Owsichek
v. State Guide Licensing & Control Board,98 a professional hunt-

95. Id. This duty is discussed at infra notes 170–91 and accompanying text.
96. See Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1154 (referring to the Louisiana Environmental
Affairs Act, which is now known as the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act and is
codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2001–30:2394 (West 1989)). This approach was
affirmed in In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (La.
1994).
97. For a discussion of Pennsylvania’s use of this technique, see supra notes 70–72
and accompanying text.
98. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
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ing guide claimed that a statutory scheme establishing “exclusive
guide areas”99 violated Alaska Constitution Article VIII, Section
3.100 The court explained that the section incorporated historical,
common law principles imposing a public trust duty upon the
state.101 The court attempted to reduce the impact of its potentially controversial decision invalidating the exclusive guide areas
created by the legislature by relying upon these “[a]ncient traditions in property rights.”102
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court used references to
common law traditions to bolster its implicit decision in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission103
that Louisiana’s constitutional provision was self-executing. In that
opinion, the court referred to the public trust doctrine as “well
settled law of this country”104 and to a provision from a prior
state constitution stating that “‘[t]he natural resources of the state
shall be protected, conserved and replenished.’”105
Finally, the Hawaii Supreme Court, although it has never
directly ruled on the self-executability of the Hawaii constitution’s
environmental provisions, has suggested that it might treat them as
codifications of the common law public trust. In Robinson v.
Ariyoshi,106 the court responded to certified questions from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concerning
water rights under Hawaiian law.107 Its opinion hinted at the
common law codification approach by noting that the “reassertion
of dormant public interests in the diversion and application of
Hawaii’s waters” was required by Hawaii Constitution Article XI,
Sections 1 and 7.108 While not determinative of the case, this language certainly evokes the public trust doctrine.109

99. Id. at 489.
100. See id. at 491.
101. See id. at 495 (citing prior decisions).
102. Id. at 493.
103. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
104. Id. at 1154.
105. Id. at 1154 n.1 (quoting Article VI, § 1 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution).
106. 658 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1982).
107. See id. at 292.
108. Id. at 311.
109. Further support for the position that Hawaii’s provisions are self-executing comes
from another section of the Hawaii Constitution, which declares that its provisions “shall
be self-executing to the fullest extent that their respective natures permit.” HAW. CONST.
art. XVI, § 16.
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Decisions from Alaska, Louisiana, and Hawaii thus illustrate a
third method for reducing resistance to a holding that a constitution’s environmental protection provision is self-executing. Holding
that such a provision merely codifies and expands the scope of a
duty previously imposed on the state legitimizes a finding that a
provision is self-executing.
D. A Provision that Informs Decisions Without a Ruling on Its
Self-Executability
A final technique by which courts can avoid the theoretical
problems of self-execution is to avoid raising the issue of self-execution at all, but then to refer to a constitution’s environmental
protection provision for guidance in making decisions. Florida
courts appear to have used this tactic.
In the first reported case interpreting the Florida Constitution’s environmental provision, Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida
Power & Light Co.,110 the state Supreme Court held that Article
II, Section 7’s expression of the public interest in natural resources
made the protection of those resources an appropriate matter for
judicial consideration in a condemnation case.111 Subsequent cases have continued to look to Section 7 for guidance. A few years
later, the court held that this provision allowed the legislature to
exempt the Florida Department of Natural Resources from actions
otherwise required by the constitutional provision establishing the
state Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission.112
No Florida court has raised the possibility that the provisions
of Section 7 might not be self-executing. This strategy has therefore allowed the exact contours of Section 7’s application to government and private action to remain undefined, but the provision
clearly has had some force in judicial decisions.

110. 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971). When the cases discussed in this Note were decided,
this provision read “It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement
of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise.” FLA. CONST. art 2,
§ 7(a).
A recent amendment to Section 7 has added a provision making those who cause
water pollution in the Everglades primarily responsible for the costs of clean-up. See FLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 7(b).
111. See Seadade Indus., 245 So. 2d at 214.
112. See Askew v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 336 So. 2d 556, 560 (Fla.
1976). For other cases using Section 7 as authority, see infra notes 214–44 and accompanying text.
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The discussion above demonstrates that courts in some states
have devised several strategies for avoiding traditional difficulties
concerning the self-executability of constitutions’ environmental
provisions. Courts in other states might accept commentators’
challenge to apply the standard presumption of self-executability to
these provisions.113 If not, the other strategies described above
could allow state courts to apply the principles embedded in environmental provisions without raising concerns about the bounds of
judicial power. Of these strategies, reference to the well-established
common law tradition of public trust law is probably the most
promising for state courts whose constitutional provisions use language evocative of the public trust.
III. STANDING
A determination that a constitution’s environmental protection
provision is self-executing does not automatically allow state citizens to use the provision in court. After determining that a provision is self-executing, courts often must decide whether these provisions grant or affect citizen standing. Standing rules have traditionally been an obstacle to environmentally concerned plaintiffs
seeking access to the courts.114 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court
liberalized federal standing requirements for pro-environment
plaintiffs, granting standing to plaintiffs with claims based on demonstrable current or future aesthetic and environmental injuries.115 More recently, however, the Court has reverted to a more
traditional and restrictive standing analysis, requiring an imminent
injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and an available remedy that will redress the
injury.116 This standard is often difficult for plaintiffs in environmental litigation to meet.117
Standing rules in state courts often create similar problems. A
common purpose of the state constitutions’ environmental provi-

113. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
114. See Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 459–60 (1972).
115. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 688–90 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
116. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
117. See Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-In-Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 12 U.C.L.A.J. ENVT’L L. & POLICY 345, 346 (1994).
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sions, however, was to grant citizens standing in environmental
suits.118 Courts in some states have appeared oblivious to this
purpose.119 In states where constitutions’ environmental protection provisions have had substantive effect, courts have paid heed
to this purpose. In Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Florida, courts
have used their constitutions’ environmental protection provisions
as authority for a more liberal interpretation of standing requirements. Courts in Michigan, Alaska, and Hawaii have suggested
that they might use their constitutions’ environmental protection
provisions in the same way. In all of these states, citizens have
been allowed to challenge particular private and governmental
actions as violations of their respective constitutions.120
A. Broad Construction of Traditional Requirements
A broad interpretation of standing requirements is the most
favorable for would-be citizen plaintiffs in environmental actions.
Courts in Pennsylvania have used their constitution’s environmental protection provisions as authority to read common law standing
requirements liberally, while courts in Louisiana and Florida have
used their constitutions’ provisions to support broad readings of
statutes governing standing. The effect in all three states has been
to increase access to the courts for citizens with environmental
complaints.
The state with the most developed law in this area is again
Pennsylvania.121 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to
dispense with Pennsylvania’s traditional common law requirements
for standing in Section 27 cases,122 but it has construed those re118. See, e.g., Kury, supra note 1, at 124; McLaren, supra note 4, at 141–42.
119. For an example of this trend, see Scattering Fork Drainage Dist. v. Ogilvie, 311
N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), where the court denied standing to a plaintiff who
claimed that a reservoir construction project would deny him of his general property
right to and interest in a healthful environment. Id. at 210. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Illinois Constitution grants each person a “right to a
healthful environment” enforceable “against any party, governmental or private.” IL.
CONST. art. XI, § 2.
120. None of the reported cases have gone so far as to allow standing for citizens
challenging the validity of a statute itself or the legislature’s failure to act in accordance
with its mandatory duty. Citizens may not be bringing such challenges, or lower courts
may be summarily dismissing them.
121. Pennsylvania’s liberal construction of standing requirements and its position on
self-execution make it appear quite progressive, but its courts’ substantive interpretation
of its provision have robbed these positions of their potential to benefit the public. See
infra notes 192–207 and accompanying text.
122. See Franklin Township v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 452 A.2d
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quirements quite liberally. The court first dealt with this issue in
Franklin Township v. Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources.123 There, it held that a party bringing a Section 27
challenge must “(a) have a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation; (b) the interest must be direct; and (c) the
interest must be immediate and not a remote consequence.”124
The court went on to find that a township and a county in which
a toxic waste disposal and processing facility had received a permit
to locate had standing under Section 27 to challenge the issuance
of the permit.125 It suggested that the protection of the environment would usually serve as the “substantial” interest required for
standing because “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being are
important aspects of the quality of life in our society.”126 The
same considerations also supported the required finding that
plaintiffs’ interests be “direct.”127 Finally, the court held that the
local governments’ interests were not “remote,” noting that “[w]e
need not wait until an ecological emergency arises in order to find
that the interest of the municipality and county faced with such a
disaster is immediate.”128 Section 27, it said, establishes a local
government’s duty to protect its citizens’ quality of life.129
Later Pennsylvania cases have followed this liberal approach.
Although an opinion by the state appellate court held that a government agency did not have standing to challenge the action of
another agency under this provision, it noted that standing requirements under Section 27 are “normally to be broadly construed,
especially where a potentially affected locality or private citizen, or
specifically empowered watchdog agency, seeks review of an environmentally sensitive [Department of Environmental Resources]
decision.”130
Louisiana courts have used a similar approach in interpreting
standing in cases brought under their state constitution’s environ-

718, 719 (Pa. 1982).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 722–23.
126. Id. at 720.
127. Id. at 721.
128. Id. at 722.
129. See id.
130. Commonwealth, Pa. Game Comm’n v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Envtl. Resources,
509 A.2d 877, 883–84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), aff’d, 555 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1989).
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mental provision. There, standing for environmentally concerned
plaintiffs is usually not governed directly by the constitution’s
provision, but by a statute which allows any person “aggrieved” by
a final decision or order from the secretary of the Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) to appeal to a court.131 Ever since
the Save Ourselves court held that Article IX, Section 1 of
Louisiana’s constitution imposes a public trust duty upon the
state,132 Louisiana courts have liberally interpreted this statute’s
requirement that plaintiffs be “aggrieved.” The courts have never
directly explained the use of this broad interpretation, but a subsequent Louisiana Supreme Court opinion provides several clues.
In In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co.,133 the
court interpreted the statutory language “final decision or order”
so as to allow citizen groups to successfully petition for review and
remand of an order granting a permit for the construction of a
solid waste facility.134 The decision noted that Save Ourselves required that the public’s environmental rights receive “active and
affirmative protection” from DEQ.135 It went on to discuss Section 30:2024(C), the statute governing citizen standing, as a part of
the “sweeping legislation”136 through which the legislature had
satisfied its “constitutional environmental mandate.”137 The court
then found that the statute’s authorization of public participation
in the review process achieves two goals consistent with the constitutional provision’s purpose: receiving public input regarding substantive environmental matters and avoiding abuses in the administrative process.138 Although the court did not explicitly say so,
it seems to have concluded that a broad interpretation of “aggrieved” was required by Section 1 of the constitution, and that
the Save Ourselves court had contemplated a broad interpretation

131. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2024 (C) (West Supp. 1996). The Louisiana legislature amended this statute in 1995, but the amendment has since been ruled unconstitutional. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 674 So.2d 1007, 1009 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (en banc) (citing In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So.2d 475 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (en
banc)). The quoted language therefore remains in effect. See id.
132. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152,
1154 (La. 1984).
133. 642 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1994).
134. See id. at 1263–66.
135. See id. at 1262 (citing Save Ourselves, 452 So.2d at 1157).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1263.
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when it held that the legislature had satisfied its duty through
statutory enactment.
In other cases, lower Louisiana courts have been faithful to
this broad interpretation. In one recent case, a number of organizations representing citizens throughout the state challenged an
exemption allowing a company to continue disposing of hazardous
waste into injection wells.139 The court held that all of these
groups were “aggrieved” by the threat the injection wells posed to
aquifers used by some members of the group for drinking water
and thus had standing.140 In another case, a court held that citizen groups were “aggrieved” by what they claimed was an insufficient DEQ penalty assessment against a violator of air quality
regulations.141 The court found that the group members’ purpose
of enjoying the nation’s outdoors had been diminished by chemical
releases, that the releases “affected and endangered” a parish and
its citizens, and that members of the groups “suffered injury in
that their physical well-being and the aesthetics of their domiciles
were diminished.”142 In a third case, civic and environmental
groups were considered “aggrieved” by the reopening of a landfill
in New Orleans because their members “live[d], work[ed], and
recreate[d]” near the landfill and because the members would
suffer additional exposure to pollution, noise, odor, and traffic.143
Article II, Section 7 of the Florida Constitution has affected
standing in much the same way. A few years after Section 7 was
added to the Florida Constitution, the legislature enacted the Environmental Protection Act (“Florida EPA”).144 A portion of this
act, Section 403.412(2)(a), allows state citizens to sue to compel
governmental agencies to perform their environmental protection
duties and to enjoin the violation of environmental laws and regulations. In Florida Wildlife Federation v. State Department of Envi-

139. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 674 So.2d 1007, 1009 (La. Ct. App.
1996).
140. See id. at 1009–10.
141. See In re BASF Corp., Chem. Div., 533 So. 2d 971, 974 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
142. Id. at 973–74.
143. In re Recovery I, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690, 694 (La. Ct. App. 1994). See also
Calcasieu League for Envt’l Action Now v. Thompson, 661 So.2d 143, 148 (La. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that an environmental group was “aggrieved” by a permit modification
that expanded only the “potential sources” of hazardous waste that could be disposed of
at a processing facility).
144. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (West 1993).
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ronmental Regulation,145 the Florida Supreme Court held that
Section 403.412(2)(a) created a new cause of action and “ensures
that the minimum requirements of standing—injury and interest in
redress—[are] met.”146 Beginning with a finding that the statute
represented a legislative attempt to implement the policy of conservation expressed in Section 7,147 the court went on to hold
that Section 403.412(2)(a) abrogated nuisance law’s “special injury
rule,” which required that an individual could not maintain a suit
to enjoin a nuisance without an injury different in kind and degree
from that suffered by the general public, for the purposes of suits
brought under the Florida EPA.148 In other words, Section 7 undergirds the ability of citizens concerned about the environment to
sue on that basis alone, without having to prove particularized
injury to themselves.
Section 403.412(2)(a) has since been interpreted to accord, at
a minimum, a statutory right to all Florida citizens to enjoin either
“patent violation” of environmental protection laws or “such palpable abuse of authority which may be said to be commensurate
with illegality.”149 Allegations presenting a factual issue concerning whether a governmental action was “arbitrary and capricious”
allow a suit to proceed on the latter theory.150 Section 403.412
(2)(a) has also provided standing to citizens seeking to require a
state water management district to establish and maintain minimum water flows as required by statute.151
The cases from Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Florida illustrate
one potential result of the interaction between constitutions’ environmental protection provisions and standing rules. Courts in both
states have used the provisions to support liberal readings of
standing requirements and thus have allowed citizens to enforce
the rights created by their constitutions’ environmental provisions.

145. 390 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
146. Id. at 66.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 67.
149. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of Cty. Comm’ners of Monroe Cty.,
456 So.2d 904, 914 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984), rev. den. sub nom Upper Keys Citizens Ass’n v.
Board of Cty. Comm’ners of Monroe Cty., 462 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1985).
150. Id. at 915.
151. See Concerned Citizens of Putnam Cty. for Responsive Gov’t, Inc. v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 622 So.2d 520, 521–22 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).
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B. Suggestions of Liberal Standing Requirements
Courts in several other states that have constitutions with
environmental protection provisions have given effect to these
provisions without explicitly ruling on standing. If, however, litigants using these provisions faced challenges based on their lack of
standing, various sources, including judicial opinions and legislative
history, suggest that courts might adopt broad readings of their
requirements as Pennsylvania and Louisiana have done. Suggestions of broad readings linked to constitutions’ environmental
protection provisions are present in Michigan, Alaska, and Hawaii.
The Michigan Supreme Court recently gave a broad reading
to a court rule granting standing in House Speaker v. Governor,152 where one aspect of the plaintiffs’ challenge was based on
that state constitution’s environmental protection provision, Article
4, Section 52.153 The court rule allows a “domestic nonprofit corporation organized for civic, protective, or improvement purposes
to bring an action to prevent the illegal expenditure of state
funds.”154 Two environmental groups challenged the governor’s
transfer of power and function from the legislatively-created Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to a new, gubernatoriallycreated DNR on the grounds that Section 52 vested authority to
protect the state resources solely in the legislature.155 Assuming
that the governor had acted without authority, the court granted
standing on the tenuous basis that “plaintiffs can be said to have
brought this lawsuit to prevent the expenditure of state funds by a
group having no lawful authority to make such expenditures.”156
The court did not refer to Section 52 in this portion of its opinion,
so the provision’s exact effect on standing remains unclear.
In Michigan, statutory law codifying the public trust in natural
resources contains provisions which explicitly grant standing to
citizens who bring suit for acts that might threaten the environment.157 These provisions currently render moot the question of
Article 4, Section 52’s effect on standing. If these statutes were
repealed, however, Article 4, Section 52 would probably be inter-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

506 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. 1993).
See id. at 199, 202.
Id. at 199.
See id. at 195.
Id. at 199.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701, 324.30110 (West Supp. 1996).
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preted to broaden traditional standing requirements. House Speaker demonstrates the Michigan Supreme Court’s willingness to read
standing requirements liberally. The self-executing nature of Section 52 and the similarity of its language to provisions in the
Pennsylvania and Louisiana constitutions that have liberal standing
requirements suggest that Michigan courts could also use decisions
from those states as persuasive authority for a holding that Section
52 liberalizes standing requirements.
The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Owsichek v. State
Guide Licensing & Control Board158 provides a similarly inconclusive but suggestive holding concerning citizen standing under
the environmental provision in that state’s constitution. The plaintiff in Owsichek was a hunting guide who challenged statutorilyestablished “[r]estricted guide areas,” claiming that the establishment of those areas violated Article VIII, Section 3 of the Alaska
Constitution.159 The court noted in dicta that Owsichek had
standing under this section, relying on the fact that his use of
wildlife as a professional guide was “sufficiently direct” to place
him within Section 3’s protection.160 The similarity of this language to the United States Supreme Court’s references to “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” injuries suggests that Section 3 might help plaintiffs satisfy the “injury” component of standing.161 Standing has never been denied in a reported case construing Section 3, but Owsichek is the only case in
which Section 3 provided the sole basis under which a plaintiff
sued.
Some authority suggests that Article XI, Section 9 of the
Hawaii Constitution might also expand citizen standing, but
Hawaii’s own courts have never addressed the issue. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in dicta, noted that the provision’s legislative history “suggests the legislature was attempting to remove
barriers to standing to sue.”162 Another commentator has also
noted that Article XI’s legislative history suggests that Section 9
was intended to give standing to private plaintiffs.163

158. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
159. Id. at 490–91.
160. Id. at 491 n.9. The court based its opinion on Owsichek’s standing to obtain
declaratory relief from the statute he challenged. See id.
161. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
162. Id.
163. See McLaren, supra note 4, at 141–42 (citing S.C. REP. NO. 77, PROCEEDINGS OF
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The exact effect of constitutions’ environmental protection
provisions on standing has not been explored in all of those states
in which the provisions have had some substantive effect. The
available evidence suggests that at least the provisions in the constitutions of Michigan, Alaska, and Hawaii could support a broad
reading of traditional standing requirements.
In summary, some of the state courts that use their constitutions’ environmental provisions as if they were self-executing,
such as courts in Pennsylvania and Louisiana, have also used these
provisions to support a liberal interpretation of traditional standing
requirements. Cases from Florida illustrate how a constitution’s
environmental protection provision can affect standing even if it is
not self-executing. Either of these strategies might work well for
other courts that have until now ducked the standing issue or
denied standing to plaintiffs suing under a constitution’s environmental protection provision.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONS’
ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS: NEW APPROACHES
TO THE PUBLIC TRUST
One or both of the hurdles of self-execution and standing
have barred some courts from reaching the merits of citizens’
claims brought under state constitutions’ environmental provisions.
Only after finding ways over or around these hurdles may a court
use its state constitution’s environmental provision as a substantive
guideline when deciding a case. The orthodox opinion is that state
courts have not reached this stage,164 but cases from the states
discussed above contradict this notion. In fact, state courts have
used their constitutions’ environmental protection provisions as
substantive law in three ways.
The first use transforms the traditional conception of the
public trust, in which courts take a hard look at the reallocation of
public resources to private parties,165 into a requirement that
state actions demonstrably benefit the public after environmental
costs are considered. The Louisiana Supreme Court uses this approach by requiring the state to show that actions potentially

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII, JOURNAL AND DEBATES (1978)).
164. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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harmful to the environment pass a cost-benefit analysis and that
they have the least possible environmental impact.166 The Pennsylvania courts purport to use this same kind of calculus, but a
twenty-year interpretive history shows that this assertion is hollow.167 Although the language of the provisions in Hawaii’s and
Michigan’s constitutions suggests that their courts might use the
approach that Louisiana courts have used, there is no existing
caselaw on this issue.
The second use of constitutions’ environmental protection
provisions is as a solid basis for expanding the traditional public
trust doctrine to resources other than water. Alaska’s courts have
used their state’s provision in this fashion, citing it as authority for
protecting public access to a variety of natural resources.168
The third use of constitutions’ environmental protection provisions is as a point of judicial reference for courts that have not yet
ruled on whether a state constitution’s environmental provision is
self-executing. This use allows courts to refer to a constitution’s
environmental protection provision and to the larger body of public trust law as persuasive authority. Courts in Florida have done
this repeatedly.169 This technique robs a provision of some of its
power, but its conservative nature might make it more appealing
to courts that have previously refrained from substantive use of a
constitution’s environmental protection provisions.
A. Transformation of the Public Trust into a Cost-Benefit Analysis
In states where constitutions’ environmental protection provisions have had the most effect, courts have interpreted these provisions in a manner that transforms the traditional public trust
doctrine into a ban on state actions that do not pass a cost-benefit
test. Louisiana is the only state in which this transformation has

166. See infra notes 170–91 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 192–207 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 214–244 and accompanying text. Michigan courts might prefer this
use of their provision over the first, since it would better comport with the state’s historical use of the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 105
N.W.2d 143, 151 (Mich. 1960) (refusing to grant the defendant company the right to
construct a loading dock on Lake Huron because of a concern that the project would
interfere with the “general public enjoyment” of the lake through fishing and boating);
Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 56–57 (Mich. 1926), adhered to, 211 N.W. 647 (Mich.
1927) (allowing the state to lease restricted lake bottom lands because the lease would
not interfere with the public’s use of the lands for hunting, fishing, or boating).
169. See infra notes 245–56 and accompanying text.
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been effective. Pennsylvania courts have proposed this use of their
state’s provision but have failed to act on their proposal. Case law
on provisions in Hawaii and Michigan is sparse, but the provisions
in those states would lend themselves to Louisiana’s approach as
well.
The original Louisiana case interpreting that state constitution’s environmental provision, Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana
Environmental Control Commission,170 explained that Article IX,
Section 1 is a “rule of reasonableness.”171 Environmental protection is not required to be an exclusive goal of the state, but “environmental costs and benefits must be given full and careful consideration along with economic, social and other factors” whenever a
state agency or official approves a proposed action affecting the
environment.172
The Save Ourselves court required the state to implement this
standard by addressing the following five “IT” questions:173
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Have the potential and real adverse environmental effects of
the activity been avoided to the maximum extent possible?
Does a cost benefit analysis of the environmental impact
costs balanced against the social and economic benefits of
the activity demonstrate that the latter outweigh the former?
Are there alternative projects which would offer more protection to the environment than the proposed activity without unduly curtailing non-environmental benefits?
Are there any alternative sites which would offer more protection to the environment than the proposed activity site
without unduly curtailing non-environmental benefits?
Are there mitigating measures which would offer more protection to the environment than the activity proposed without unduly curtailing non-environmental benefits?174

170. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
171. Id. at 1157.
172. Id.
173. The questions are named after the party seeking approval for a hazardous waste
facility, IT Corporation. See id. at 1154.
174. The IT questions did not appear as a set in the original Save Ourselves opinion,
see id., but they have been consolidated by later cases. This formulation is a quote from
In re Dravo Basic Materials Co., 604 So. 2d 630, 632 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1992). More
recent cases have collapsed the final three questions into one. See, e.g., In re Rubicon,
Inc., 670 So.2d 475, 483 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (asking whether there are “alternative projects or alternative sites or mitigating measures which would offer more protection to the
environment than the activity proposed without unduly curtailing non-environmental benefits”).
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The supreme court remanded the case to the administrative agency
for further findings.175 The court explained that answers to these
questions do not require particular substantive results. Rather,
Section 1 “leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion” by
the state.176
The cost-benefit analysis described by Save Ourselves has
subsequently been used repeatedly to evaluate state actions challenged under Article IX, Section 1. In In re Dravo Basic Materials
Co.,177 for example, plaintiffs challenged the state Department of
Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) denial of a water discharge permit
for shell dredging operations in Lake Pontchartrain.178 The reviewing court upheld the denial on the basis that the social and
economic benefits of allowing the dredging did not exceed the
potential environmental costs of allowance.179 The court explained that DEQ’s inquiry when issuing water discharge permits
should include not just an examination of the discharge itself, but
an examination of “the entire activity which results in the discharge [and] the effect of the discharge on the environment in
general.”180
In In re Recovery I, Inc.,181 the IT questions ensured that a
New Orleans landfill was reopened only after DEQ demonstrated
that adverse environmental impacts were avoided to the maximum
extent possible.182 In fact, the court noted a “symbiotic relationship” between the environment and the effect on the economy of

175. See Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1161. Later reported cases demonstrate that
the first two IT questions are commonly used in tandem. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
176. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157. The Save Ourselves court repeatedly cites as
authority for its holding the landmark decision concerning the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA), Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Save Ourselves, 452 So.
2d at 1157, 1159. But the Save Ourselves test has a substantive power not shared by
NEPA. The former allows state actions to be permanently forbidden on the basis of
environmental considerations, while the latter requires only that the government consider
the environmental impact of its actions.
177. 604 So. 2d 630 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
178. See id. at 632.
179. See id. at 636.
180. Id. at 635. The court allowed DEQ to consider estimated environmental costs of
continued shell dredging, noting that “[h]arm to the environment cannot always be quantified as easily as the economic benefits derived from taxes and salaries.” Id. at 636.
181. 635 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 639 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1994).
182. See id. at 700.
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the reopening of the landfill, because the project would provide
New Orleans with an additional waste site while simultaneously
generating the funds to eventually close the facility in an environmentally sound manner.183
In another Louisiana case, In re American Waste & Pollution
Control Co.,184 the court concluded that Article IX, Section 1 allowed citizens’ groups to successfully petition for review and remand of an order granting a permit for the construction of a solid
waste facility.185 The court remanded the case because it could
not determine from DEQ’s initial conclusory order whether it had
balanced the benefits of the facility against the risks or whether it
had determined that adverse environmental impacts had been
minimized.186
The power of the IT questions is perhaps best illustrated by
In re Supplemental Fuels, Inc.187 In that case, an appellate court
upheld DEQ’s denial of an operating permit for a hazardous waste
treatment facility on the sole ground that the permit application
had failed to address IT question four, concerning the existence of
alternative sites.188 In reaching its decision, the court reaffirmed
DEQ’s “constitutional mandate to determine that the adverse
environmental impacts have been minimized or avoided as much
as possible consistently with the public welfare.”189
These cases all illustrate how the Louisiana courts have fashioned a meaningful cost-benefit standard from out of the public
trust provision in their state’s constitution.190 Cost-benefit analysis
is open to criticisms of vagueness and unpredictability, as are all
balancing tests, but it is a technique with which courts are familiar.191 By fashioning this standard, Louisiana courts have helped

183. See id.
184. 642 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1994).
185. See id. at 1262, 1266.
186. See id.
187. 656 So.2d 29 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
188. See id. at 38.
189. Id.
190. For other examples of this provision at work, see In re E.I. du Pont Nemours &
Co., 674 So.2d 1007 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc); In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So.2d 475
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc); In re Browning-Ferris Indus. Petit Bois Landfill, 657
So.2d 633 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
191. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) (using a cost-benefit test to
analyze a Sixth Amendment confrontation clause issue); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 657–58 (1984) (using cost-benefit analysis to justify a “public safety” exception to the
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give effect to the values expressed in the Louisiana Constitution’s
environmental provision.
The Pennsylvania Constitution’s environmental provision is
textually similar to that used in Louisiana, but its application in
practice has been vastly different. According to the Commonwealth Court in Payne v. Kassab,192 “Section 27 was intended to
allow the normal development of property in the Commonwealth,
while at the same time constitutionally affixing a public trust concept to the management of public natural resources of Pennsylvania.”193 The result, the court claimed, would be “controlled development” instead of “no development.”194
Payne accompanied this rhetoric with a three-pronged test to
ensure that judgments about controlled development in Section 27
cases would be “realistic and not merely legalistic.”195 The test
requires that a court answer three questions when faced with a
challenge to state action under Section 27:
1.

2.
3.

Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s
public natural resources?
Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce
the environmental incursion to a minimum?
Does the environmental harm which will result from the
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would
be an abuse of discretion?196

This test was cited approvingly by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court three years later in a case in which the court examined the
same factors.197
Questions 2 and 3 of the Payne test are weaker versions of
Louisiana’s IT Questions 1 and 2.198 Payne’s Question 2 requires
a “reasonable effort” to minimize adverse environmental effects

exclusionary rule).
192. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
193. Id. at 94.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The street-widening project at issue in Payne was allowed to go forward
because the court answered the first two questions affirmatively and the final question
negatively. See id. at 94–96.
197. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273, 273 n.23 (Pa. 1976).
198. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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rather than IT Question 1’s requirement that “potential and real
adverse environmental effects . . . be[] avoided to the maximum
extent possible.”199 Likewise, Payne’s Question 3 undercuts the
unweighted cost-benefit analysis required by IT’s Question 2
(whether the environmental impact costs “outweigh” the social and
economic benefits of the activity) by allowing actions to occur
unless the environmental harm “clearly outweighs” their benefits.200 In practice, these differences have combined with judicial
interpretations of the Payne test to completely rob it of power: the
Payne test has never been used to overturn a state action.
The first prong of the Payne test, which asks whether the
challenged act complied with all relevant statutes and regulations,
would appear to be superfluous when viewed next to the other
two prongs; it would be odd to hold that a self-executing constitutional provision took effect only when a statute or regulation had
been violated.201 In a subsequent case, however, the state appellate court reached exactly this conclusion. Snelling v. Department
of Transportation held that Article I, Section 27 “does not require
consideration of factors beyond those which, by statute, must be
considered in evaluating projects which are potentially harmful to
the environment.”202 This holding alone eviscerates Payne by denying that a violation of Section 27 can occur unless the state has
violated a statute.
Other prongs of the Payne test have fared no better. The
second prong imposes on the state a duty to consider and mitigate
the environmental impacts of its actions, but subsequent decisions
have defined this duty so restrictively that this prong adds virtually
nothing to a court’s analysis. Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly
used Snelling’s reasoning to hold that Section 27 does not require
government agencies to consider factors beyond those statutorily
required when considering actions potentially harmful to the environment.203 Also, while the duties of trusteeship are shared
among the branches of the state government, Section 27 does not

199. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
200. See id.
201. Later cases addressing standing, however, have not referred to this prong of the
test. See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
202. 366 A.2d 1298, 1305 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
203. See, e.g., Borough of Moosic v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 429 A.2d 1237,
1240 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Community College of Delaware County v. Fox, 342 A.2d
468, 480–82 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
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give the governor the power to disturb the operation of laws
passed by the legislature which are otherwise in accordance with
the state constitution.204 In short, the second prong of the Payne
test boils down to the same question posed by the first prong: has
the challenged governmental entity violated a law?
The third prong of the Payne test should do the real substantive work. On its face, it would allow a judicial invalidation of a
government action even if all relevant statutes had been complied
with and environmental impact had been reduced to a minimum,
provided that the environmental harm still clearly outweighed the
benefits of the action. Despite this theoretical power, in Section
27’s twenty-five year history, not a single one of the over thirty
reported decisions interpreting Section 27 has ruled that the environmental harm which would result from the challenged decision
or action clearly outweighed the benefits to be derived therefrom.205
By effectively rejecting any real review under the Payne test,
the Pennsylvania courts have undermined the intent of the Pennsylvanians who adopted the state constitution’s environmental
protection provision. The provision’s author, Franklin Kury, argues
that the Payne test has served a useful function as a foundation
for a series of state environmental protection statutes and administrative agency decisions,206 but he acknowledges the “consistent
reluctance” of courts to enforce the amendment.207 Despite the
facial resemblance of the constitutional provisions and the costbenefit tests extracted from those provisions in Louisiana and
Pennsylvania, Louisiana’s standard has served the apparent purposes of the state citizens in adopting a constitutional provision much
better than has Pennsylvania’s.
The language of the environmental provisions in the constitutions of Hawaii and Michigan is quite similar to the language of
Louisiana’s provision and might therefore support a similar inter204. See National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Casey, 600 A.2d 260, 265 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991), aff’d, 619 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1993).
205. See, e.g., Szarko v. Department of Envt’l Resources, 668 A.2d 1232, 1239–40 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995), app. den., 683 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1996) (dismissing landowner’s claim that
the issuance of various permits for a landfill violated Article I, Section 27); Borough of
Moosic, 429 A.2d at 1239–40 (holding that a public utility commission’s transfer of property to a private party without an inquiry into the environmental impact of the grantee’s
proposed use of the land did not violate Article I, Section 27).
206. See Kury, supra note 1, at 130–41.
207. Kury, supra note 1, at 129.
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pretation.208 Hawaii courts have not dealt with their state constitution’s environmental provisions enough to derive a standard
from them, although the Hawaii Supreme Court has hinted that
Article XI contains some teeth. In one case, the court faced a
request for an injunction preventing the Honolulu Board of Water
Supply’s diversion of a stream flow that was damaging the
plaintiff’s crops.209 Although Article IX was not dispositive in
that case, the court cited Section 1 of the Article as proof that the
public may have an interest in a free-flowing stream for its own
sake.210 Later in the same year, the court cited Article XI, Sections 1 and 7 in support of a holding that:
The reassertion of dormant public interests in the diversion and
application of Hawaii’s waters has become essential with the
increasing scarcity of the resource and recognition of the public’s
interests in the utilization of flow of those waters.211

The court also suggested that the parameters of this public interest
should be developed on a case-by-case basis.212 Because Article
XI creates a public trust for Hawaii’s natural resources much like
that created by the Louisiana constitution, Hawaii courts could refer to Louisiana cases in developing their constitution’s public trust
provisions into a requirement of environmental cost-benefit analysis.
Similarly, Michigan cases construing that state constitution’s
environmental provision have not articulated a substantive standard to guide decisions. Given Michigan’s extensive body of common law public trust cases and public trust statutes,213 such a
standard is probably unnecessary. If Michigan courts were to fashion a standard based on the state constitution’s environmental
protection provision, the similarity of the provision’s language to
that of Louisiana’s and its self-executability could also support
reference to Louisiana cases as persuasive authority.

208. The language in these constitutions’ provisions is also similar to the language in
Pennsylvania’s provision. Even if courts in Hawaii and Michigan were to adopt
Pennsylvania’s test, they could still give effect to their citizens’ desires by interpreting the
test in a less lopsided fashion.
209. See Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 59 (Haw. 1982), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1014 (1985).
210. See id. at 76 n.20 (dictum).
211. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982).
212. See id. at 312.
213. See supra note 157.
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B. Expansion of the Public Trust to New Resources
The second option for the use of a constitution’s environmental protection provision is as an expansion of traditional public
trust principles to resources other than navigable waters and the
lands beneath them. Alaska courts have led the way here, using
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Alaska Constitution as the constitutional embodiment of a desire to apply traditional public trust
precepts to a range of natural resources, and as part of Article
VIII’s larger guarantee of equal access to those resources. Alaska
courts have actually developed two different standards to implement this provision—one based on the traditional public trust
doctrine and another that operates analogously to equal protection
analysis.
Owsichek provides the clearest statement of Section 3’s more
traditional meaning. There, the court held that common law principles incorporated into Section 3 “impose upon the state a trust
duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state
for the benefit of all the people.”214 The Owsichek court acknowledged that the limits of the state’s discretion in implementing this duty were not well-defined, but it rejected the state’s
contention that its discretion was unbridled.215 Rather, it held
that “a prohibition against any monopolistic grants or special privileges” was a minimum requirement of the duty.216 This principle
has since been reaffirmed by the Alaska Supreme Court.217
The prohibition against monopolistic grants or special privileges has been used to void several legislative schemes controlling
access to Alaska’s natural resources. Owsichek overturned a state
law which created exclusive guide areas and allowed access only to
those hunting guides assigned to those areas.218 A statute granting a preference to rural residents to take fish and game for subsistence purposes was also held unconstitutional under this stan-

214. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 495.
215. See id. at 495–96.
216. Id. at 496.
217. See McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 5–6 (1989). This principle had also appeared
in prior cases. See CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Alaska 1988);
State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1189, 1191 (Alaska 1983); Herscher v. State Dep’t of
Commerce, 568 P.2d 996, 1003 (Alaska 1977).
218. See Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 498.
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dard as a special privilege.219 In State v. Ostrosky,220 the Alaska
Supreme Court upheld the state’s limited entry fishing law against
a Section 3 challenge only because another portion of the constitution had been specifically amended to allow such limits.221 The
court has also held that Section 3 required that state tidelands
conveyed to private parties remain subject to a public trust easement, unless the conveyance either was made in furtherance of a
specific public trust purpose or would not substantially impair the
public’s interest in the tidelands.222 Finally, the Alaska Supreme
Court relied on Article VIII to invalidate an initiative to control
access to salmon in Pullen v. Ulmer.223 The court held that “the
public trust responsibilities imposed on the State by the provisions
of article VIII of our constitution compel the conclusion that fish
occurring in their natural state are property of the state for
purposes of carrying out its trust responsibilities.”224
The Alaska Supreme Court has also used Section 3 in a more
novel fashion. In Ostrosky, the court first suggested that Section
3’s common use directive might be read along with other portions
of Article VIII seemingly dedicated to the idea of equal access so
as to require that any system of limited entry imposed on state
fisheries entails the “least possible impingement” of equal access.225 Justice Jay Rabinowitz’s dissent advocated a least-restrictive alternative requirement for Article VIII cases because of the
“highly important interest [in natural resources] running to each
person within the state.”226 The Owsichek opinion cited this portion of the dissent with approval.227
In McDowell v. State,228 the court wholeheartedly approved
this position for cases brought under Sections 3, 15, or 17 of Ar-

219. See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 12.
220. 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
221. See id. at 1190. But see McDowell, 785 P.2d at 9 (noting that the state constitution does not bar exclusion from resources if that exclusion is required for species protection).
222. See CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1119–20 (citing Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 435, 453 (1892)).
223. 923 P.2d 54, 60–61 (Alaska 1996).
224. Id. at 60.
225. Otrosky, 667 P.2d at 1191. This standard was reaffirmed in Johns v. Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission, 758 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Alaska 1988).
226. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1196 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
227. See Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 492 n.10.
228. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
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ticle VIII.229 McDowell and the other plaintiffs in the case challenged an act that granted a preference to rural residents over
urban residents to take fish and game for subsistence purposes.230
The plaintiffs were urban residents who had hunted for subsistence
in the past and wanted to continue to do so.231 The court held
first that the residence requirement violated the common-use provision in Section 3.232 As an alternate ground for its decision, the
court overturned this statute with a least-restrictive-alternative
analysis.233 This analysis operated much like strict scrutiny in a
standard equal protection case.234 The court deemed “important”
the state’s interest in ensuring that those residents who needed to
could engage in subsistence hunting and fishing, but it rejected the
statute’s urban-rural distinction as an “extremely crude” method of
achieving its goal.235 It recommended a classification scheme that
used individual characteristics as the least restrictive means of
accomplishing the statute’s goals.236
Several years later, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on
McDowell to overturn a portion of a new statute governing subsistence hunting and fishing.237 The stricken provision of the statute
impermissible conditioned permit eligibility on the proximity of
permit applicants’ residences to the relevant fish or game popula-

229. See id. at 9. Section 15 provides:
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized
in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of
the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation,
to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them
for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the
State.
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
Section 17 provides: “Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural
resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject
matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation.” ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §
17.
230. See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 1.
231. See id. at 2.
232. See id. at 9.
233. See id. at 10.
234. Laws examined under strict scrutiny will not be sustained unless they are necessary to further the achievement of a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to find a durational residence requirement for voter registration violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
235. See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 10.
236. See id. at 11.
237. See State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d 632, 638 (Alaska 1995).
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tion.238 McDowell’s focus on equal access created some tension
with the public trust duty to manage the state’s natural resources
for the benefit of all of its people, since unlimited equal access
can lead to resource depletion.239
Recognizing this tension, the Alaska Supreme Court explained
in Tongass Sport Fishing Association v. State240 that Article VIII
is “not implicated unless limits are placed on the admission to resource user groups.”241 The state cannot prevent any group from
access to resources, but it may allocate the existing resources
among various users.242 Because allocation does implicate Article
VIII concerns in the same way as admission and because allocation decisions are “so complex and multi-faceted,” the least-restrictive-means test is not used to review allocation decisions.”243
Rather, allocation decisions are “upheld so long as they are not
unreasonable or arbitrary and proper procedures have been followed.”244
With the advent of this least-restrictive-means test, Alaska
courts have derived two substantive standards from their
constitution’s environmental provision, both of which have been
used to invalidate state action. The first standard, an expansion of
the traditional public trust prohibition on acts not consistent with
the public’s interest in access to natural resources, is used more
often. This standard would also be much easier for courts in other
states to adopt, as it does not require the judicial creation of a
doctrine. Courts in Hawaii and Michigan might also prefer this
standard over that used in Louisiana for the same reason. The
least-restrictive-means standard is more politically radical, but
would allow courts to use a clear test and a familiar mode of
analysis.

238.
239.
Garrett
240.
241.
242.
640–41.
243.
244.

See id.
The phenomenon is commonly known as the “tragedy of the commons.” See
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
866 P.2d 1314 (Alaska 1994).
Id. at 1318.
See id. This distinction was affirmed in Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d at
Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d at 641–42.
Id. at 641.

FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\KIRSCH.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:45am

1208

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46 : 1169

C. Use of Constitutions’ Provisions as Persuasive Authority
A third potential use of state constitutions’ environmental
provisions is as persuasive authority in relevant cases. This use
would have particular appeal in states where the provisions are not
considered self-executing. Cases from Florida provide the best
example of this technique, and demonstrate an opportunity for
other state courts to give effect to their state constitution’s environmental protection provisions despite theoretical or political
pressures to hold that such provisions are not self-executing.
One context in which Florida courts have used their state’s
provision is to challenge condemnation actions by utilities. Seadade
Industries Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. held that Florida
Constitution Article 2, Section 7 allows a court overseeing condemnation proceedings to require, first,
that the condemning authority reasonably demonstrate that the
regulations and requirements of the independent authorities [governing the operation of the industry in question] can and will be
met . . . [and] second, that condemnation and taking in advance
of project approval will not result in irreparable damage to natural resources and environment, should the independent authorities
decline to approve the proposed project.245

The environmental provision requires that “[a] rational balance
must be struck” between the protection of natural resources and
the completion of public works in the public interest.246 In another utility case,247 a lower court referred to Section 7 in upholding
an order denying a petition for a taking of an individual’s personal
property.248 The court faulted the petition because the condemning utility had given no “real ecological consideration” to the
uniqueness of a proposed power line route.249
Section 7’s full substantive reach as a non-self-executing provision is unclear. The Florida Supreme Court has cited it to uphold
the state Department of Natural Resources’ introduction of a new
species of fish into a lake to control aquatic weeds250 and to dis-

245.
246.
247.
review
248.
249.
250.

245 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1971).
See id.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Berman, 429 So. 2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983).
See id. at 83.
Id.
See Askew v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 336 So. 2d 556, 557, 559–60
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miss a challenge to an emergency statute requiring that shrimp
nets be used with devices to exclude endangered turtles.251 It was
also used to uphold a property tax exemption claimed by the
Trust for Public Land, an organization that buys private land and
holds it for sale to public bodies.252 The court deciding this case
cited Section 7 in its holding that land conservation was a “use” of
land that served a public purpose.253
The most sweeping decision concerning Section 7 is also the
most recent. In Department of Community Affairs v. Moorman,254
the Florida Supreme Court relied on Section 7 to uphold the application to a private landowner of an ordinance banning fence
construction.255 The court upheld the ordinance, designed to protect endangered Key deer, against equal protection, privacy, and
due process challenges, noting that Section 7 protected Floridians’
interests in their economy, health, welfare, and safety.256
Read as a group, these cases illustrate that the Florida courts
have used their constitution’s provision to require environmentally
informed decisionmaking. While this use of such provisions is less
powerful than those described in Sections IV.A. and IV.B., it does
give some force to citizens’ desires, as expressed in the provisions
themselves. It also allows courts to more easily avoid sticky theoretical issues surrounding self-execution and standing.
CONCLUSION
The environmental protection provision added to the Pennsylvania Constitution on Earth Day, 1971, has been criticized by most
commentators, who have viewed efforts to enshrine environmental
protection as a state constitutional value as failures.257 In the
context of the other provisions discussed in this Note, however,
Pennsylvania’s provision is more accurately seen not as a symbol
of the complete failure of such provisions, but rather as an em-

(Fla. 1976).
251. See
252. See
1984).
253. See
Ct. 1971)).
254. 664
255. See
256. See
257. See

State v. Davis, 556 So.2d 1104, 1107–08 (Fla. 1990).
Turner v. Trust for Public Land, 445 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
id. (citing Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Scopelliti, 321 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Sup.
So.2d 930 (Fla. 1995).
id. at 932–34.
id.
supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
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blem of their mixed ability to support the values for which they
were enacted. The promise of efforts to place environmental values within state constitutions is reflected in the Pennsylvania
provision’s imposition of a new duty of environmental protection
on the state and its bolstering of citizens’ ability to sue the state
for breaches of that duty. Despite these successes, experience with
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s provision has also demonstrated
the state judiciaries’ unwillingness to interpret environmental protection provisions so as to give content to the values they contain.
Cases construing the Pennsylvania constitution’s provision have
developed from this provision what could be a workable cost-benefit balancing test, but have found that the balance rested against
the environment in every reported case.
The history of Pennsylvania’s provision is particularly disappointing because it shares the references to the ideas of conservation, trusteeship, and public access, ideas contained in environmental protection provisions that have been interpreted as having
substance in states such as Louisiana and Alaska. By finding ways
around theoretical problems of self-execution and standing, courts
in these and the other states discussed in this Note have used the
ancient public trust doctrine to breathe life into otherwise moribund constitutional provisions.
The wisdom of relying on the public trust doctrine as a modern means of environmental protection is certainly open to debate.258 However, the decisions of the courts in this minority
plainly reflect the common understanding of the citizens who enacted the provisions in the first place. They also give greater respect to the extended commitment to environmental protection
reflected in the adoption of these provisions.
Many of the currently dormant environmental protection provisions in state constitutions share the successful minority’s references to public trust principles. These provisions might be creatively used by environmentally concerned plaintiffs in other states to
force their judiciaries to grapple with the meaning of their citizens’
constitutional commitment to environmental values.

258. See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text.

